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E
, arly in 1999, a small, poor, and backward 
, corner of Europe became the center of 
J world attention. On March 24, the self- 
proclaimed greatest military alliance in history 
began a 78-day bombing campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), allegedly to 
force it to accept the terms of an international 
settlement for regulating the FRY's relations with 
its rebellious province of Kosovo. NATO's 
“Operation Allied Force” soon went awry, 
however, as myriad miscalculations on the part of 
all the relevant players to this drama quickly' 
threatened to spiral out of control. Then-Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin openly warned that 
NATO's actions could lead to world war, the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy' in Belgrade 
heightened Great Power tensions even further, and 
the unity of the Adantic Alliance itself was severely' 
tested. In the aftermath of the conflict, Kosovo has 
joined Bosnia in becoming another Balkan 
protectorate of the international community'; 
Macedonia may yet become a member of tliis 
collection, and even Albania's future is uncertain.
How did a small-scale guerrilla war manage to 
become the focal point of a global crisis? The three
books under review here, though very different in 
their scope, all shed light on the problems 
confronting international policies in the region, and 
the misperceptions about the Balkans underlying 
these policies. Glenny's book is the most ambitious, 
offering a grand sweep of nationalist movements 
throughout the Balkans over the past 200 years. 
Vickers provides a well-focused history' of 
Albanian-Serb rivalry' over Kosovo, with the bulk 
of her book concentrating on twentieth century 
events. Judah concentrates on the immediate 
background to the Kosovo conflict of the 1990s 
and the war itself (and at the same time offers a 
commendable example of what a journalist's first 
draft of history should look like). All three books, 
however, suggest that much of what the 
“international community'” has been attempting to 
do in the Balkans has been based on a significant 





The bulk of recent writings on the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia have focused blame for the 
state’s disintegration on malevolent politicians and 
leaders who deliberately stirred up popular 
prejudices to keep themselves in power. Richard 
Holbrooke, for instance, claims that “Yugoslavia's 
tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of 
bad, even criminal, political leaders who 
encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, 
political, and financial gain.”1 Along similar lines, 
Warren Zimmerman has noted that “Yugoslavia's 
death and the violence that followed resulted from 
the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who 
coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated 
all opposition to their demagogic designs. 
Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down.”2
A succinct summary of much of the thinking in 
this school of thought can be found in a recent 
report on the November 2000 elections in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina produced by the International Crisis 
Group:
Despite five years and five billion US dollars of 
international community investment in Bosnia, the 11 
November Bosnian elections demonstrated once again that 
international engagement has failed to provide a sustainable 
basis for a functioning state, capable of surviving an 
international withdrawal. The elections highlighted once again 
the near complete failure—in the face of determined 
nationalist extremism—of an international approach that 
places emphasis on hopes that moderate, co-operative Bosnian 
partners will come to power through elections. The elections 
also revealed the complete unsuitability’ of the present Dayton 
constitutional structures, as well as the international 
community’ implementing structures and policies... Many in the 
international community had naively hoped that democratic 
change in Zagreb and Belgrade would translate into change
1 Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 
1998), pp. 23-24.
2 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: 
Times Books, 1993), p. vii. This mode of thinking leads to 
some rather perverse logic; for instance, the belief that in 
bombing a country for 78 days you are waging war against 
an individual, not against a country or a people. NATO 
Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, for instance, 
recently claimed “The 19 democratic nations of the Alliance 
did not commit an act of aggression against the Yugoslavian 
(sic) people. We did not have anything against them. We 
acted against Milosevic.” See Yuri Pankov’s interview with 
Robertson, “Dialogue, Not Confrontation,” in Krasnaya 
Zvepda (Moscow), 20 February 2001.
among Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs. To the contrary, these 
democratic victories appear to have energized Bosnia’s ethnic 
extremists.’
A careful reading of the above suggests that 
these “ethnic extremists” must have almost 
superhuman abilities. Neither the passage of time 
nor the expenditure of billions of dollars can defeat 
their agenda. They are able to defy the will of the 
international community7, and have found ways of 
sabotaging or subverting constitutional 
arrangements designed by7 the brightest (?) minds at 
the U.S. State Department.4 * *They are impervious to 
positive democratic changes in Bosnia’s immediate 
regional environment. They7 are even able to waylay 
the will of the people, as expressed in elections 
organized, supervised, and paid for by the 
international community7.
Such views, however, do not take us very7 far in 
understanding what is happening in the Balkans. 
The belief that entire societies can be manipulated 
in this way, as Rogers Brubaker points out, reduces 
the general population to being “passive dupes, 
vehicles or objects of manipulative designs” instead 
of “active participants” and “political subjects in 
their own right.”3 Nor can such views explain why7
3 Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles
(Sarajevo/Brusscls: International Crisis Group Report No. 
104), 18 December 2000, Executive Summary.
4 On this note, it is worth pointing out that many people 
involved in Balkan policy over the past decade have decried 
the appalling lack of understanding about the Balkans 
exhibited by international personnel dealing with the region. 
As Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia recently noted, “There are more people (in Sarajevo) 
who know nothing about this place than in any other capital
where I’ve ever served.” See Klein’s comments as quoted by 
Robert Wright, Irena Guzelova, and Jonathan Birchall, 
“Bosnia-Herzegovina: Fear proves to be the biggest vote-
winner,” The Financial Times (London), 18 December 2000, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Survey. Along the same lines, 
the above-quoted report by the ICG (p. 17) claims that the 
international effort in Bosnia has been “hampered by a rapid 
turnover of often unqualified personnel, lacking relevant 
experience, including sometimes in senior positions.” To 
this, one should add that many of today’s so-called “Balkan 
experts” often exhibit a woeful ignorance of, or even 
interest in, anything that happened in the former Yugoslavia 
prior to 1987.
’ Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Keframed: Nationhood and the 
National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 72. Brubaker’s comments were
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nationalist parties in places such as Bosnia are able 
to win election after election for more than a 
decade,* 6 even though the leaders of these parties 
come and go.
Alija Izetbegovic once described the mass 
appeal of national issues by saying, “If you call for 
an open forum on democracy, a hundred 
intellectuals show up. If the forum is about 
nationalistn, you will get 10 thousand people from 
all walks of life on the streets.”7 In a more scholarly 
vein, Ivo J. Lederer observed in his classic 1969 
essay, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,”
The eastern European “way of life” is akin to a stream made 
up of a variety of tributaries of which nationalism is only one, 
but nationalism has run so deep and strong that it has 
appeared to possess an elemental, almost gravitational, quality’. 
...nationalism has been the fundamental fact of life for nearly 
two hundred years. Nowhere has this been so clear and 
agonizingly the case as in the lands of the Yugoslavs.8
But while astute politicians and scholars have 
recognized the historical force and social depth of 
tliis phenomenon, far too many others have failed
made in reference to the Krajina Serbs in the period 1990- 
91. If the average citizen in Southeastern Europe is indeed a 
“passive dupe,” perhaps we should reconsider the extent to 
which it is worth the effort to foster Jeffcrsonian-style 
democracy in the region.
6 In fact, in every election held in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
twentieth century, the inhabitants have voted along ethnic 
lines, essentially malting elections ethnic censuses. See 
Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnia-I lerzegovina: State and 
Communitarianism,” in D.A. Dyker and 1. Vejvoda, eds., 
Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and 
Rebirth (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), pp. 
87-115. With regard to the post-Dayton period, of course, 
one could question the degree to which elections have any 
real meaning, insofar as representatives of the international 
community have been given the power to dismiss publicly 
elected officials from office—a power used with increasing 
frequency in recent years.
7 Cited by Carsten Wieland, “Izetbegovic und |innah-die 
selektive Vereinnahung zweier ‘Muslim-Euhrer’.” 
SudosteuropaMitteilungen (1999/Nr. 4), p. 351.
8 Ivo j. Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,” in
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Peter E Sugar and Ivo J.
Lederer, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1969), p. 396.
to grasp its significance.9 This misdiagnosis of the 
problems facing southeastern Europe, however, 
often leads to seriously flawed policies. The three 
books under-review here provide a useful corrective 
by showing that the problems of the former 
Yugoslavia long predate the emergence of 
Slobodan Milosevic or Franjo Tudjman.
Two points bear stressing here. First, nationalist 
conflict in the Balkans is not merely the result of evil 
leaders stirring up ethnic hatred for the sake of 
their own personal political gain. Although we can 
always count on politicians to embrace policies that 
will further their ambitions, as A.J.P. Taylor once 
noted, "Statesmen exploit popular emotion; they do 
not create it."10 Instead, nationalist leaders gain 
popular support when ethnic groups believe they 
face an existential threat to their survival, a threat 
best confronted by the creation of strong, viable 
nation-states enjoying significant levels of popular 
support and legitimacy.
What determines the timing of these outbreaks 
of interethnic conflict in the Balkans is usually a 
function of events in the wider geo-strategic order. 
More specifically, when the international order 
imposing a modicum of security in the region 
breaks down, individuals resort to seeking security’ 
in their collective national/ethnic identity’.11 Thus,
9 On the reasons why many westerners fail to appreciate the 
popular strength of nationalism, see, for instance, Joseph 
Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: 
Columbia University-' Press, 1981), Chapter 1. See also 
Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in Understanding Political 
Development, Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987), pp. 196-220. 
Indeed, medievalists have begun to attack the entire 
contemporary academic paradigm of nationalism as a 
"modern" phenomenon by showing that the "invention" of 
nations and nationalism itself long predate the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. On this note, see Adrian Hastings, 
The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 233.
11 Tor useful interpretations of ethnic conflict in the Balkans 
from this perspective, see Barry R. Posen, “The Security 
Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” and )ack Snyder, 
“Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” both 
in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
pp. 103-124, and 79-101, respectively. Eor a detailed 
examination of how the security dilemma affects Bosnia-
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the Ottoman Empire's decline in the nineteenth 
century provided the space for Balkan nations to 
rebel against their imperial overlords, most notably 
in the Serbian rebellion of 1804 and the Greek 
Insurrection of the 1820s, both of which Glenny 
covers in a lively fashion. The process proceeded 
throughout the nineteenth century, with, for 
example, the Herzegovinian peasants' rebellion in 
the late 1860s. In light of more recent Bosnian 
history7, it is worth recalling a passage from the 
“Unification Proclamation” issued by the leaders of 
the Serb revolt in 1876:
After so much waiting and without hope for any type of help, 
we resolve that from today we forever break with the non- 
Christian rule of Constantinople, and desiring to share our fate 
with our Serb brothers . . . proclaim that we are uniting our 
homeland Bosnia to the Principality' of Serbia.1"
But the Serbs were not the only ethnic group 
striving to carve their own nation-state from the 
“sick man of Europe.” As Vickers points out (pp. 
42-45), in June 1878, Albanians from various parts 
of the Balkans gathered to form the Prizren League, 
an organization devoted to developing an Albanian 
national program to counter that of the various 
Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian programs then 
emerging as the Ottoman empire decayed. The 
delegates to the meeting proceeded to claim areas 
of present-day Macedonia, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro for the Albanians. Many other ethnic 
groups in the Balkans had their own versions of a 
“greater” national program as well.
Tliis desire on the part of the peoples of 
southeastern Europe to create viable nation-states 
differed little from similar national programs in 
other parts of Europe. As Gale Stokes has 
described this process,
Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the 
major threads of post-French Revolutionary European history. 
The process began with the unifications of Italy and Germany,
Herzegovina, see Susan L. Woodward, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War,” in Barbara F. 
Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity and 
Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
pp. 73-115.
12 "The Unification Proclamation" of 1876, as quoted by 
Nebojsa Radmanovic in Krajiski Nojnik (Banja Luka), 28 
June 1997, p. 34.
ran through the creation of new states at the end of World 
War I, and had its most catastrophic outcomes at the end of 
World War II with the Holocaust and the expulsion of the 
Germans from Eastern Europe . . . the wars of Yugoslav 
succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they 
arc the last stages of a process of European redefinition that 
has been going on since the French revolution.13
Indeed, as lstvan Deak adds, “the creation of 
nation-states has been so much a part of modern 
European history7 as to allow us to call it 
inevitable.”14 *
Here it bears stressing that war and its attendant 
violence has been part and parcel of the European 
state-building process; in Charles Tilly’s classic 
formulation, “War made the state, and the state 
made war.”13 Viewed in this context, however, 
many of the explanations offered for the violence 
attending the disintegration of the former Yugoslav 
state, whether “ancient ethnic hatreds” or “elite 
manipulation,” assume only secondary7 importance. 
Instead, it is infinitely more fruitful to understand 
the logic underlying military7 strategies during the 
‘Wars of the Yugoslav Succession” as being driven 
by the imperatives of creating viable states. In the 
former Yugoslavia, as Susan Woodward notes, the 
various ethnic factions were each struggling to win 
“the geopolitical and institutional preconditions of 
sovereignty: obtaining the strategic and economic 
assets and borders of a secure future state, 
destroying those of one’s enemies, and building (in 
the course of war) the armies and foreign alliances 
of a new defense.”16 *
A second point bears mentioning here as well. 
Given the general state of illiteracy prevailing in the 
Balkans in the nineteenth century, and the absence 
of anything resembling twentieth century7 mass 
media, a review of Balkan history over the past 200
13 Gale Stokes, "The Unpalatable Paradox," Nationalities 
Papers 27 (June 1999), pp. 327-329.
14 lstvan Deak, "A Somewhat Pessimistic View of Charles 
Ingrao's 'Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central 
Europe'," Nationalities Papers 21 (June 1999), p. 320.
Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State- 
Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States 
in Western TLurope (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1975), p. 42.
16 Susan Woodward, Flalkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 
After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1995), p. 272.
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years should make us rethink the emphasis recently 
placed on the role of the mass media in the breakup 
of the former Yugoslavia. This is not to say that the 
means of communication in a peasant society at the 
time were benign; Glenny, for instance, cites one 
Albanian epic poem:
z\s always, Albanian and Slav
Were at blood since a tragic fate
Placed fire and gunpowder side by side.
Placed side by side Albania and Montenegro!17
But while historical and cultural legacies may 
have emphasized conflict between ethnic groups 
rather than coexistence, it is a far cry to claim that 
such conflict was conjured out of nothing by evil 
leaders. That is, unless we want to believe that just 
as radio and television supposedly whipped 
Albanians, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs into 
fratricidal frenzies in the 1990s, gusla's, frula's, 
tambura's and epic poems did the same in the 
nineteenth century'. Indeed, if, over the course of 
45 years, a communist regime (with all of the 
propaganda instruments such a system had at its 
disposal) was unable to inculcate a sense of 
“brotherhood and unity” amongst the peoples of 
the former Yugoslavia, it is hard to believe that 
Izetbegovic, Milosevic or Tudjman could drive 
them into a fratricidal frenzy in a matter of two or 
three.
Instead of blaming evil leaders and malevolent 
media for the violence of the 1990s, a more 
powerful explanatory model should seek to 
understand Balkan nationalist struggles over the 
past two centuries, as Stokes suggests, as simply a 
later manifestation of a common European state- 
and nation-building process. What interrupted this 
“inevitable” flow of modern European history in 
the Balkans was the tendency of the Great Powers 
to use the Balkans as the playground for their 
competitive games, the main thesis of the Glenny' 
book.
One of the most important efforts by' the Great 
Powers to protect their interests in the Balkans was 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and Glenny' 
provides a vivid account of the disdain with which
17 Gjaku i marrun (Blood avenged), cited by Glenny on p. 
151.
representatives of the Great Powers treated the 
delegations of various Balkan ethnic groups. Forty' 
years after the Congress of Berlin, in the midst of 
the Great War (the spark of which had of course 
been lit in the Balkans), Nicholas Murray Butler 
would write,
Everyone can now sec that the Treaty of Berlin was one of the 
most colossal blunders in modern political history. It so 
shuffled the cards of diplomacy as to mislead the people 
concerning the game which was being played, and instead of 
settling the grave questions with which it dealt, that Treaty 
simply glossed them over and opened the way for a new 
military' struggle ... 18
Subsequent attempts by the Great Powers to 
address the shortcomings of the Congress of Berlin 
faired little better in achieving a stable solution for 
southeastern Europe. In 1918, as Michael Ignatieff 
points out, Woodrow Wilson
...enunciated the right of self-determination for the peoples of 
the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the 
draftsmen at Versailles then laid out the borders that the 
Balkan states have been fighting over, off and on, ever since... 
Eighty years later, America continues to try to remedy the 
errors of Versailles.19
One is tempted to believe that more recent 
efforts by the Great Powers to create “order” in the 
Balkans will be seen by subsequent generations in 
the same light. Tellingly, both Glenny' and Judah 
write that the turning point in the Albanian struggle 
for Kosovo was what happened in Bosnia; more 
specifically, the agreement negotiated to end the 
conflict there, the Dayton Peace Accords (hereafter, 
the DPA). For regardless of the spin international 
officials use to describe the DPA (i.e., that it 
created the basis for a “united state with two 
multiethnic entities”), the fundamental reality' of 
Dayton was that it ratified the creation of mono­
ethnic entities created by force and the violent 
expulsion of ethnic minorities. In this, it was similar 
to the U.S.1 support for the expulsion of the Krajina
18 Sec Nicholas Murray Butler's introduction to Vladislav R. 
Savic, Southeastern Europe: The Main Problem of the Present World 
Struggle (New York: Fleming R. Revell Company, 1918). 
Butler, incidentally, was at the time the President of 
Columbia University.
19 Michael Ignatieff, “The Dream of Albanians,” in The New 
Yorker, 11 January' 1999, p. 36.
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Serbs in August 1995, for among Western countries 
there was “the unspoken but ever-present feeling 
that if there were no more Serbs in Croatia, then, in 
future, there would be no more problem either” 
(Judah, p. 121).20 The lesson for extremists (on 
both sides) in Kosovo was thus obvious: violence 
and ethnic cleansing would be tolerated and 
endorsed. One need only pick the right 
international patrons.
Timothy Garton Ash once noted that “what we 
are proposing to do in our Balkan quasi 
protectorates is not just to freeze war. It is also to 
freeze history.”21 What have been the results of tliis 
effort to “freeze” history? Take, for instance, the 
case of Bosnia. Over the past eight years, the 
international community has spent an astronomical 
550-90 billion trying to bring peace to the country', 
to rebuild its infrastructure, reform its political and 
economic systems, and produce a non-national, 
pan-ethnic democratic consciousness on the part of 
its population.22 Over 20,000 international troops 
and 15,000 international civilian personnel are 
currently in Bosnia organizing elections, postponing 
elections, reversing electoral results, imposing laws, 
rewriting primary' school textbooks, creating 
television networks, monitoring customs services, 
police forces, and military' units, regulating the 
airwaves, reforming the judiciary', setting up a stock 
market... the list is literally' endless. And for all of 
tliis effort, the locals still have an unlimited number 
of ways of obstructing and/or derailing the best- 
intentioned of efforts. A report issued by the U.S.
20 Not all international officials shared this opinion. As 
Glenny (p. 650) cites a statement by Carl Bildt at the time, 
"If we accept that it is alright for Tudjman to cleanse Croatia 
of its Serbs, then how on earth can we object if one day 
Milosevic sends his army to clean out the Albanians from 
Kosovo?"
21 See Ash, “Cry', the Dismembered Country,” Tie New York 
Renew of Books, 14 january 1999, p. 32.
22 for the estimate on how much the international
community has spent in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s,
see Jasna Ilasovic, “Pola budzeta za plate sluzbenika,” Dani 
(Sarajevo), 8 September 2000. Determining a precise amount
is impossible because different agencies use different
methodologies for calculating their expenses. Contrast these 
figures with B-ITs annual GDP, estimated at S6.2 billion in 
1999. I lasovic and others estimate that over half of this 
amount has been spent on the salaries of foreign “experts” 
themselves.
Congress’ General Accounting Office in 2000 
noted that “there has been no measurable progress 
in reducing crime and corruption in the four years 
since the end of the war.”23 In part due to such 
corruption, if one factors out the donor aid Bosnia 
has received, the country' would have experienced 
negative economic growth in the postwar period.24 *
Not surprisingly, Bosnia-ITerzegovina’s young 
people are voting with their feet to escape tliis 
situation; a recent study by a U.N. agency found 
that 62 percent of the country's young people 
would leave Bosnia if they' had a way' out.23 As one 
international official captured the problems 
experienced in trying to impose the international 
agenda on Bosnia,
We’ve played all the cards: the money, the advice, the pressure. 
We have done everything my country has learned to do in two 
hundred years of meddling in other countries. I still wonder if 
it is enough to achieve what we want.26
21 Christopher Marquis with Carlotta Gall, “Congressional 
Report Says Corruption is Stifling Bosnia,” The New York 
Times, 7 July 2000, p. A3.
■4 Why Wilt No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina?: An 
Overview of Impediments to Investment ami Self Sustaining Economic 
Growth in the Post Dayton Era. Sarajevo: International Crisis 
Group, 21 April 1999, p. 8.
2’ The public opinion survey by the U.N. Development 
Program was cited by High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch in a speech before the European Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels on 22 January 2001.
26 The New York Times, 13 September 1998. In a similar vein, 
after a particularly difficult period of trying to force 
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs into agreeing to a common 
currency, license plates, and passports, former Deputy I Iigh 
Representative Jacques Klein claimed, ““Never in the 
history of diplomacy was so much time and effort expended 
by so many diplomats over such trivia.” See the Speech by 
Klein before the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, 21 April 1999, available at
http://www.ohr.int/speechcs/s99042fa.htm. It is an 
interesting exercise to contrast this exasperation with the 
thoughts of one of the protagonists in the Andric novel 
Bosnian Chronicle, I lamdi Bey Teskeredzic, who, when the 
people of Travnik learned that a French consul was being 
sent to their town, exclaimed, “We’re on our own ground 
here, and anyone else who comes is a stranger and won’t be 
able to hold out long. Many people have come here 
intending to stay, but so far we’ve seen the back of all of 
them.” See Ivo Andric, Bosnian Chronicle (London: Harvill 
Press, 1992), p. 3,
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The above analysis is not meant to deny the 
essentially noble purposes of much of what the 
international community is attempting to 
accomplish in the Balkans. But a mistaken 
understanding of the forces driving the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has led to 
mistaken remedies. The root of the “problem” in 
the Balkans has not been “evil leaders.” Rather, it 
has been the efforts of the various ethnic groups in 
the former Yugoslavia to create states reflecting 
their national identities and aspirations, states which 
provide them with a measure of collective security, 
and states which allow them to participate as 
recognized partners in the international community. 
Unfortunately, many of the short-term policies 
adopted to deal with “evil leaders” in the Balkans, 
uninformed by a comparative perspective of similar 
phenomena during other historical periods or in 
other parts of the world, have been 
counterproductive, if we believe that the real goal 
of international engagement should be to foster the 
economic and social stability needed to sustain 
democratic polities. They have also led to pohcy 
disasters such as NATO’s war in Kosovo.
II. Madeleine's War
Soon after Dayton, extremists in Kosovo 
created an obscure organization named the 
“Kosovo Liberation Army.” The KLA's initial 
actions involved murdering mailmen, forest 
rangers, Serb refugees, and the occasional ambush 
of a pohce patrol (Judah provides the most detaEed 
account in EngEsh of the KLA's origins pubEshed 
to date). By February 1998, the U.S. State 
Department's top Balkan envoy, Robert Gelbard, 
would claim that “the KLA is, without doubt, a 
terrorist organization.”
Throughout 1998, the confEct between the 
KLA and Yugoslav government forces constituted 
a fairly typical guerrilla war and counter-insurgency 
campaign, with all of the excesses common to such 
warfare27; as Deak notes, “history has still to show
2' On this note, it is worth pointing out that several KLA 
leaders are now under investigation by the I Iague Tribunal 
for war crimes committed by KLA forces in 1998-long 
before the NATO intervention. See Tom Walker, "KLA 
Laces Trials for War Crimes on Serbs: Inquiry Turns on 
Albanians," The Sunday Times (London), 3 September 2000.
a poEce or miEtary force that did not grow ruthless 
when attacked by fighters dressed as civiEans.”28 
Prior to March 1999, the fighting in Kosovo had 
been confined to areas in which the KLA had been 
active; Kosovo's major urban areas, such as 
Pristina, Djakovica, and Kosovska Mitrovica, and 
large parts of eastern and southern Kosovo, saw 
Ettle or no violence. Even vociferous supporters of 
the NATO intervention now admit “there was no 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1997, or in 1998, 
or in most of 1999, in any conventionahy 
understood sense of the term.”29
Yet, as Timothy Garton Ash notes of the KLA, 
this “bunch of farmyard Albanian ex-Marxist- 
Leninist terrorists”30 *very quickly managed to draw 
NATO into the first war in its 50-year history. Flow
The commander of the Kosovo Protection L'orce, Agim 
Ceku, is already believed to be the subject of a sealed 
indictment for war crimes because of his activities during 
the war in Croatia from 1993-95. The political leader of the 
KLA, Hashim Thaci, has been directly linked to a massacre 
of 22 Serb civilians in the village of Klecka in the summer of
1998, and with the assassination of political rivals within 
Kosovo. See Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Rebels Accused of 
Executions in the Ranks," The New York Times, 25 June
1999, p. 1. See also Tom Walker, "KLA Chief Accused of 
War Crimes," The Suticky Times (London), 10 October 1999. 
Recent assassinations of Thaci's political opponents in the 
wake of Kosovo's October 2000 municipal elections suggest 
his understanding of a democratic transfer of power is 
rather different than Western notions of the term.
28 See Istvan Deak, “Out of the Past," The New Republic, 8 
June 1998. Indeed, as this is being written and we watch the 
growing death toll in the violence between Israeli forces and 
Palestinian demonstrators, we are reminded yet again that 
the struggle between different peoples over land is almost 
always a brutal and bloody affair. Consider, for instance, the 
price of the first six weeks of fighting between Israelis and 
Palestinians in the most recent unrest: according to a U.N. 
report, Israeli forces have destroyed 431 private homes, 13 
public buildings, 10 factories, and 14 religious buildings. The 
human costs of the fighting left over 200 people dead in the 
first six weeks, the vast majority of whom were Palestinian 
civilians. Other tactics adopted by Israeli security forces 
have included extra-judicial assassinations of suspected 
“troublemakers,” and prohibitions on travel for 
communities of tens of thousands of people. See William A. 
Orme ,r., “Palestinian Economy in Ruins, U.N. Says,” The 
New York Times, 6 December 2000, p. A12.
29 David Ricff, “Kosovo’s Humanitarian Circus,” World Po/iy 
Journal 17 (Pall 2000), p. 27.
J° See Timothy Garton Ash, "Kosovo: Was it Worth It?" in
The New York Review of Books, 21 September 2000, p. 53.
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it managed to do so will remain a matter of 
controversy for a long time to come; certainly, it 
has much to do with Western misconceptions of 
what has been driving events in the former 
Yugoslavia (i.e., "evil leaders" instead of historical 
processes). Similarly, it also has much to do with 
the very palpable need among Western leaders, and 
especially those in the U.S., to find a new raison 
d’etre for NATO's continued existence.
Glenny and Judah also cite evidence claiming 
that all sides simply stumbled into the war. 
Milosevic believed that NATO was bluffing, and 
that even if NATO attacked, European public 
opinion would never tolerate a long-term campaign. 
Milosevic may also have calculated that standing up 
to a NATO attack could strengthen his position at 
home.
But Milosevic was not the only one to 
miscalculate. NATO did not have any contingency 
plans worked out for a longer conflict, and the 
original list of bombing targets was exhausted 
within a matter of days. In a very cogent analysis of 
American miscues along the way to the Kosovo 
war, Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz 
point out that on March 24, the first day of the 
bombing campaign, U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, the single person most 
associated with the war, declared “I don't see this as 
a long-term operation.” Just eleven days later, 
however, Albright would say, “We never expected 
this to be over quickly.”31
In light of more recent evidence that has 
emerged since these books were written, however, 
it is worth considering to what extent the decision 
to go to war against the FRY really was a 
miscalculation. Considerable circumstantial 
evidence points to the conclusion that hawks within 
the Clinton Administration, led by Albright, were 
eager for a showdown with Milosevic and were 
determined to create a scenario in which a military 
confrontation would be all but inevitable. A 
significant turnaround in U.S. policy was clear by
31 See Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Lor the 
Record," The National Interest, L’all 1999, pp. 9-15. Lor an 
example of the extent to which the war in Kosovo came to 
be associated with the U.S. Secretary of State, see the cover 
story of Time magazine for 17 May 1999, entitled "Albright 
at War."
November 1998 when the State Department began 
to claim that Milosevic was the problem in the 
region, not the solution. By this time, the CIA had 
already spent a considerable amount of time 
providing I<LA operatives with American military 
training manuals, field advice, satellite telephones, 
GPS systems, and even General Wesley Clark's 
mobile phone number.32 And when a controversial 
effort to find a political solution to the crisis was 
made in February' and March 1999 during the 
Rambouillet talks, a senior State Department 
official allegedly claimed that the U.S. had 
“deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could 
accept.”33
After the failure of the Rambouillet talks, the 
U.S. decision to begin a bombing campaign 
dramatically escalated the fighting in Kosovo, and 
directly triggered the massive refugee movements 
that followed; as Glenny (p. 658) notes, "Instead of 
preventing a humanitarian catastrophe, NATO's 
decision contributed to a flood of biblical 
proportions." Oddly enough, the U.S. State 
Department itself has accepted the view that the 
NATO bombing triggered the massive forced 
expulsions of the Albanian population in Kosovo. 
In a report released in the midst of the Kosovo 
war, the State Department claimed, “In late March 
1999, Serbian forces dramatically increased the scope 
and pace of their efforts, moving away from 
selective targeting of towns and regions suspected 
of KLA sympathies toward a sustained and 
systematic effort to ethnically cleanse the entire 
province of Kosovo.”34 * *
Moreover, NATO's post-hoc justifications for 
the attack have crumbled since the end of the war. 
Two weeks into the air campaign, NATO claimed 
that it had attacked for fear that the Yugoslav 
military had been planning a so-called “Operation 
Horseshoe” to drive the Albanian population out
32 Tom Walker and Aidan Lavcrty, "CIA Aided Kosovo 
Guerrilla Army," The Times (London), 12 March 2000.
33 George Kenney, "Rolling Thunder: the Rerun," The 
Nation, 14 June 1999. The Rambouillet talks themselves have 
been derided by critics as a perfect example of the recent 
American penchant for “drive-by diplomacy.”
34 See Erasing Histoty: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo. Washington,




of Kosovo. In April 2000, however, it was revealed 
that the alleged Operation Horseshoe had been a 
Bulgarian military assessment of possible Yugoslav 
military options, which the Bulgarians forwarded to 
the German Defense Ministry?3 Once the NATO 
attacks began, of course, Yugoslav military units 
and paramilitary forces did begin a massive 
operation to expel ethnic Albanians from possible 
invasion routes into the country—a completely 
predictable response, but one for which NATO 
leaders did nothing to prepare for. As Douglas 
Macgregor notes, “Faced with a population that 
concealed and supported the KLA, the Yugoslav 
forces did exactly what U.S., French and British 
forces have done in counterinsurgency operations: 
they expelled the population and removed the 
insurgency’s base of support.”36
Another aspect of the NATO propaganda 
campaign involved the claim that "genocide" was 
being committed in Kosovo. NATO and U.S. 
officials Eberally claimed that up to 100,000 people 
had been killed by Serb forces. Yet in August 2000, 
a spokesman for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
announced that the number of people killed in 
Kosovo during the NATO attacks would probably 
fall between 2-3 thousand. Moreover, as various 
observers have noted, with NATO bombs falling 
all over the province, and factoring in the fighting 
between the KLA and Yugoslav forces, "not all of 
the dead can be proved to be the victims of murder 
or execution."37
’’John Goetz and Tom Walker, "Serbian Ethnic Cleansing 
Scare Was a Fake, Says General," The Sunday Times 
(London), 2 April 2000. Judah (pp. 240-41) also questions 
the extent to which "Operation Horseshoe" really existed, 
and Ash (p. 57) cites a report on the Kosovo conflict 
compiled by the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs 
Committee which is also skeptical.
36 See Douglas Macgregor, “The Balkan Limits to Power and 
Principle,” Orbis 45 (Winter 2001), p. 100. It should be 
pointed out that during the Kosovo war, Colonel Macgregor 
was chief of strategic planning and director of the Joint 
Operations Center, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe.
37 See Jonathan Steele, "Figures Put on Serb Killings Too 
High," The Guardian (London), 18 August 2000; Daniel Pearl 
and Robert Block, “Despite Tales, the War in Kosovo Was 
Savage, but Wasn’t Genocide,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 
December 1999, p. A01. This is not to dismiss the war
In military terms, NATO could take little pride 
in its performance. A preliminary7 NATO review of 
the Kosovo campaign concluded that Operation 
Allied Force "had almost no military7 effect."38 
According to a secret U.S. military assessment 
leaked to the press, 38,000 sorties (including the use 
of 31,000 rounds of radioactive depleted uranium 
shells) over 78-days of bombing managed to 
destroy 14 tanks and an insignificant number of 
armored personnel carriers and artillery7 pieces.39 
When all was said and done, NATO had inflicted 
embarrassingly little damage on the Yugoslav 
military7. As Ash points out,
It is a remarkable fact that for at least a month the most 
powerful military alliance in history7, with member states 
representing some two thirds of the world's economic and 
military7 strength, with four million men and women under 
arms, and combined defense spending of around S450 billion, 
seemed to be losing the war to a small, impoverished Balkan 
country with a defense budget of scarcely $1.5 billion and 
about 110,000 active-duty soldiers.40
crimes committed by Serb paramilitary7 forces in Kosovo, 
actions for which the ICTY indicted Milosevic and four of 
his top associates on 27 May 1999. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the NATO attack dramatically7 escalated the scale of the 
violence in Kosovo at the time. For a very7 explicit 
denunciation of crimes committed by Serb forces during the 
Kosovo campaign, see the interview with Fr. Sava Janjic in 
NIN (Belgrade), 8 July 1999.
38 Daniel Goure and Jeffrey Lewis, "The Strained U.S. 
Military7: Evidence from Operation Allied Force," National 
Security Studies Quarterly 6, Winter 2000, pp. 25-35; Tim 
Butcher and Patrick Bishop, "NATO Admits Air Campaign 
Failed," The tlkctromc Telegraph, 22 July 2000.
39 See John Barry and Evan Thomas, "The Kosovo Cover- 
Up," Newsweek, 15 May 2000, pp. 23-26. Britain's Royal Air 
Force did not do too well in Kosovo either. A secret RAF 
report leaked in August 2000 showed that of 150 "dumb" 
bombs (i.e., conventional munitions not using laser-guided 
technology), only 3 could be confirmed to have hit their 
target—a 2 percent success rate. See Michael Evans,
"Kosovo 'Dumb-bombs' Missing in Action," The Times 
(London), 15 August 2000.
40 Ash, op. cit., p. 57.
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Unable to destroy the Yugoslav army from the 
air, afraid to fight it on the ground, but desperate to 
salvage its “credibility,” as the war dragged on 
NATO decided to expand the bounds of what was 
an acceptable level of “collateral damage.” As 
NATO's target list expanded, bombs started falling 
on prisons, hospitals, refugee convoys, television 
studios, and the occasional foreign embassy.
Tliis new strategy', however, also required 
NATO to engage in what can only be described as 
war crimes. As Michael Mandelbaum points out, 
the targeting of electrical grids and water facilities 
violate Article 14 of the 1977 Protocol to the 1949 
Geneva Convention, which bars attacks on “objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population.”41 A Human Rights Watch study of 
NATO's conduct of the Kosovo war estimated that 
500 civilians had been killed, and that a third of all 
the incidents and more than half of the deaths 
occurred as a result of attacks on illegitimate 
and/or questionable targets. The report concluded 
that NATO committed numerous violations of 
international humanitarian law in its Kosovo 
campaign.42 Amnesty International was more 
explicit, openly calling the bombing of the Serbian 
state television and radio building (SRT) in which 
16 civilians were killed a war crime, and calling on 
NATO governments to bring to justice the persons 
responsible for the decision to attack this and other 
targets.43
NATO's prosecution of the war raises many 
other disturbing issues as well. NATO's use of
41 See Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War 
Against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 78 (September/October 
1999), p. 6.
42 Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Washington, 
D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 7 February 2000.
43 Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of 
War by NATO during Operation Allied Force. London: Amnesty 
International, 7 June 2000. Predictably, the Pentagon's own
assessment of its performance during the Kosovo war has
been called a “whitewash” by other groups. As William
Arkin, a military consultant to Human Rights Watch has 
noted, '"Phis was a war advertised as humanitarian in 
purpose, in which the Pentagon stressed that it was doing 
everything possible to minimize civilian casualties. Yet its 
report does not mention one measure taken or one lesson 
learned." "Pentagon Report Whitewashes Civilian Deaths in 
Yugoslavia," Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 8 
February 2000.
cluster bombs, harshly criticized by international 
human rights groups,44 * has left a legacy of 
destruction that will last for years. Over 150 people 
have been killed by unexploded NATO ordinance 
in the postwar period. The Pentagon, however, has 
prohibited U.S. soldiers from being used to defuse 
leftover munitions.43 Along with the damage done 
to the FRY's infrastructure and population, one 
must also consider the environmental damage done 
by NATO's bombing of chemical plants and oil 
refineries along the Danube. (If the Danube flowed 
northwards and westwards towards Austria and 
Germany rather than southwards and eastwards 
towards Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria, rest assured 
that those oil refineries and chemical plants would 
never have been touched.) Not surprisingly, a 
United Nations task force investigating the 
environmental impact of the NATO attack on 
Yugoslavia reported that NATO had obstructed its 
investigation and had refused to cooperate with 
U.N. experts.46
Politically, Operation Allied Force has proven to 
be a failure as well. Postwar Kosovo is effectively 
partitioned north of the Ibar River, and the 
agreement negotiated to end the conflict, codified 
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, in many
44 "NATO Use of Cluster Bombs Must Stop," Kosovo Human 
Rights Flash #36. New York: Human Rights Watch, 11 May
1999.
43 "Four Kosovar Children Killed by NATO Cluster Bomb," 
Reuters, 22 September 1999; "Kosovo Child Killed and Five 
Injured by Leftover NATO Bomb," Reuters, 14 March 2000; 
Carlotta Gall, "U.N. Aide in Kosovo Faults NATO on 
Unexploded Bombs," The New York Times, 23 May 2000; 
Jonathan Steele, "Death Lurks in the Fields," The Guardian 
Unlimited, 14 March 2000.
46 Frances Williams, Christopher Brown-Humes and Neil 
Buckley, "Kosovo: NATO 'Hindered' Inquiry." The Financial 
Times, 15 October 1999. Doctors in Bosnia report that 
refugees from the Sarajevo suburb of I Iadzici, which was 
heavily bombed by NATO in 1995, are experiencing three 
times the rate of deaths from cancer typical for other 
residents of Bosnia. See “Svaki treci dan neko umire od raka, 
na grobljima vise nema mjesta,” Os/obodjenfe (Sarajevo), 13 
January 2001. See also Robert Fisk, “I see 300 graves that 
could bear the headstone ‘Died of depleted uranium’.” The 
Independent (London), 13 January 2001, p. 1. For an extended 
analysis of the environmental impact of the NATO attacks 
during the Kosovo campaign, see Vojin Joksimovic, 
“Militarism and Ecology: NATO Ecocide in Serbia,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 11 (Fall 2000), pp. 140-160.
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ways affirmed the Yugoslav government’s 
objections to the Rambouillet proposals. As 
Michael Mandelbaum points out,
The Albanians had fought for independence based on the right 
to self-determination. The Serbs had fought to keep Kosovo 
part of Yugoslavia in the name of the inviolability of existing 
borders. While insisting that Kosovo be granted autonomy, 
NATO asserted that it must remain part of Yugoslavia. The 
alliance had therefore intervened in a civil war and defeated 
one side, but embraced the position of the party it had 
defeated on the issue over which the war had been fought. 
This made the war, as a deliberate act of policy, a perfect 
failure.47
The final act in this “perfect failure,” however, 
has yet to be played out. As the international 
community’s effort to abide by UNSCR 1244 
increasingly conflicts with the KLA’s goals, the 
potential for conflict rises commensurately. Indeed, 
NATO forces (including American troops) have 
already come under fire from guerrillas on several 
occasions, and as one U.S. intelligence official 
noted of ties between NATO and the KLA, “Not 
only is the honeymoon over, but now the divorce 
has begun.”48 What remains to be seen is how 
brutal and unpleasant the divorce will actually be.
One tiring, however, is clear. As the 
contradictions inherent within UNSCR 1244 lead 
to greater instability within Kosovo, the Presevo 
Valley, and Macedonia, no one will be able to claim 
that KLA leaders were anything less than candid 
about their intentions. As Judah (pp. 103-104) cites 
the words of one KLA leader:
Kosova starts in Tivar |Bar in Montenegro] and ends in 
Manastir [Bitola in Macedonia]. We don’t care what .America 
and England think about it, we should unite with actions, not 
with words. We don’t care what Clinton and other devils think!
Finally, it is worth asking what the Kosovo 
campaign portends for the future of “humanitarian
47 Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 5.
48 Sec “Kosovo: What Next?” Janes intelligence Report, 28 June
2000; Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Patrols Edgy Border, 
This Time Protecting Serbs,” The New York Times, 25 
January 2001; “Ethnic Albanian Guerillas Claim Macedonia 
Attacks,” Agence France Presse, 27 January 2001; “British 
Troops Battle Kosovo Albanians,” Renters, 1 Eebruary 2001; 
D. Joksic, “Makedonija puna obucenih militanata,” 
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 4 Eebruary 2001.
intervention,” so widely touted as the justification 
for violating numerous aspects of international law, 
and for threatening regional and international 
stability. Carl Cavanaugh Hodge, for one, has 
argued,
Historically, the principle of national sovereignty has never 
been so absolute as is often assumed, yet its contribution to 
international peace has been significant enough that any 
abridgement of the principle in the name of superseding values 
ought to be accompanied by an authentic commitment to 
those values. Such a commitment was nowhere in evidence in 
the case of NATO's Kosovo adventure. The alliance failed— 
indeed never attempted—to protect the life and limb of the 
very people for whom it fought. It is therefore to be wished 
that Kosovo sets no precedent.49
Indeed, despite claims that NATO's war against 
Yugoslavia marked a milestone in international 
relations, reality will most probably prove quite 
different. Ronald Steel is undoubtedly right when 
he claims the Kosovo conflict left the principle of 
“humanitarian intervention”
about where it began: as the exception rather than the rule. 
Intervention will occur where it can be done relatively cheaply, 
against a weak nation, in an area both accessible and strategic, 
where the public's emotions are aroused, and where it does not 
get in the way of other political, economic, or military needs.’"
In other words, “humanitarian intervention” 
will be done when it is politically useful—not when 
it is morally obligatory.’1 All told, the architects and
49 Garl Cavanaugh Hodge, "Casual War: NATO's 
Intervention in Kosovo,” Ethics and International Affairs 14, 
pp. 53-54.
Ronald Steel, "East Timor Isn't Kosovo," The New York 
Times, 12 September 1999, p. 19.
31 On this note, Andrew J. Bacevic poses an interesting 
question. Given the fact that conflicts in other parts of the 
world often involve human tragedy on a much greater scale, 
Bacevic asks, “According to what criteria do the United 
States and its allies determine that some humanitarian 
catastrophes demand attention, while others—usually 
involving people of color—go unattended?” See Bacevic, 
“Banal and Dubious,” The National Interest 61 (ball 2000), pp. 
94-97. During the Rwanda crisis—when upwards of 400,000 
people were literally hacked to death in a matter of weeks—a 
report by the Organization of African Unity claims that 
Madeleine Albright consistently prevented bringing the issue 
of Rwanda up before the U.N. Security Council during her 
tenure as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. The report cites 
the former Canadian ambassador to the U.N. as saying,
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proponents of “Madeleine's War” have nothing to 
be proud of. As one of Britain's most respected 
commentators, Simonjenkins of the London Times, 
summed up NATO's Kosovo campaign, if tliis was 
“victory,” then it could at best be considered “a 
victory for cowards.”
III. NATO's Kosovo
Perhaps even more disturbing than NATO’s 
original decision to attack Yugoslavia is the fact that 
in the postwar period it has refused to create an 
environment in which the various ethnic groups 
inhabiting Kosovo can live in peace and security. 
The obsession with force protection and the 
overwhelming determination not to suffer any 
NATO casualties in the province has made murder, 
kidnapping, arson, and extortion the defining 
features of life in Kosovo under NATO. As James 
Orbinski, the president of Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(the organization which won the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1999), noted when announcing that MSF would 
leave Kosovo, “There has been a passive 
acceptance of acts of violence against minorities. A 
culture of impunity has emerged.”* 32
Indeed, a typical month in postwar Kosovo 
certainly does not leave room for anyone to believe 
that NATO has created a haven of tolerance or 
stability, as the KLA and its offshoots have gone 
on an unchecked rampage of assassinations and 
other forms of terrorism. Consider, for instance, 
the situation on the ground in Kosovo in August 
2000, fourteen months after NATO occupied the 
province to establish “peace.” On August 2, Sejdi 
Koci, the leader of Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK) in the town of Srbica, 
was wounded by an unknown gunman. Also on 
August 2, a mine planted on a road near the village
“The role of the United States ... is an almost
incomprehensible scar of shame on U.S. foreign policy. 'I’he 
United States . . . knew exactly what was going on ... I 
don’t know how Madeleine Albright lives with it.” See 
Colum Lynch, “West Turned Back on Rwanda Genocide, 
OAU Report Says,” The Washington Post, 8 July 2000, p. A14.
32 "Nobel-Winning Agency Blasts UN, NATO in Kosovo," 
Renters, 17 August 2000. See also "Ethnic Cleansing 
Continues in UN-Ruled Kosovo, Under the Eye of the 
International Actors," Meileeins Sans Frontieres, press release, 7 
August 2000.
of Mali Alas killed three Roma and injured one. On 
August 3, an assassination attempt wounded Agim 
Veliu, an LDK leader from Podujevo. On August 
5, another senior LDK member, Shaban Manaj, 
was found dead ten days after his family had 
reported him missing. On August 6, an LDK leader 
in Srbica, Mehmet Gerkinaj, was also wounded in 
an assassination attempt. On August 9, the wife of 
Avni Salihu, an LDK leader in Dragas, was killed 
when a bomb was thrown down the chimney of the 
Salihu family home. On August 13, an Albanian 
gang attacked and seriously wounded an elderly 
Serb couple in the village of Kriljevo, near 
Kosovska Kamenica. On August 18, hand grenades 
were thrown at a group of Serb children playing 
basketball at an outdoor court in Crkvena Vodica, 
wounding over a dozen. Also on August 18, the 
Orthodox church in Vucitrn was destroyed, and a 
bomb exploded in a U.N. building in Pristina 
housing several international organizations. On 
August 19, the Orthodox church in Velika Reka 
was destroyed after being the target of five previous 
bombing attacks. On August 23, KFOR troops 
themselves came under attack when unknown 
assailants fired rifle grenades at the KFOR 
compound in Vucitrn. (The attack was believed to 
be in revenge for the killing of two Albanians by 
KFOR troops earlier in the month.) On August 27, 
an Albanian hit-and-run driver drove his vehicle 
into a group of children in the Serb village of 
Skulanevo (near Lipljan), killing one child and 
injuring several others. The same day, an 80 year- 
old Serb man was killed by a burst of machine-gun 
fire while tending his cattle in the village of 
Crkvena Vodica.
July wasn't much better. Neither was 
September.
Former KLA members (as well as members of 
its successor organization, the so-called “Kosovo 
Protection Force,” or KPC), are routinely involved 
in various criminal activities and violence.33 Under- 
NATO's watch the province has become the transit 
point for some 40 percent of the heroin sold in
Lor example, the arrest on August 23,d of Refki Sumen, a 
former KLA leader and currently a senior figure in the KPC, 
arrested on suspicion of being involved in extortion, 
smuggling, and homicide. "Kosovo Guerrilla Chief Arrested 
in Mafia Probe," Agence France Presse, 24 August 2000.
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Europe and North America?'1 In the first year of 
NATO’s occupation of the province, over 500 
murders were committed (the vast majority against 
Serbs and other ethnic minorities), yet what is 
euphemistically called a legal justice system in 
Kosovo had failed to return a single conviction?3 
KFOR and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) report that theft, blackmail and 
kidnapping in Kosovo increased 70 percent in 2000 
as compared with 1999?6 In the summer of 2000, 
KFOR troops discovered a list drawn up by the 
KLA's secret intelligence service to assassinate 
various politicians in both Kosovo and Albania. Of 
the fifteen people on the list, three had already been 
murdered?7 In January 2000, U.N. police raided the 
apartment of Hashim Thaci's brother and 
discovered DEM 500,000 in cash, the proceeds of 
various racketeering activities?8 As one senior U.S. 
Army officer described the new structure of power 
in Kosovo, “We call it a thugocracy. The mafia, the 
politicians and the so-called freedom fighters are all 
connected.”33 * * * * 38 9 And, of course, as has now become 
painfully evident, on NATO’s watch Kosovo has 
become a playground for terrorist groups intent on 
destabilizing all of the southern Balkans.
“Freedom of the press” in NATO's Kosovo 
also takes some disturbing forms. On April 27,
54 Sec Maggie O'Kane, "Kosovo Drug Mafia Supply Heroin 
to Europe," The Guardian Unlimited, 13 March 2000. Before 
the war, international police officials estimate two metric 
tons of heroin passed though Kosovo en route to Western 
markets monthly. Since NATO occupied Kosovo, the 
amount has increased to 4.5-5 metric tons monthly.
33 Steven Erlanger, “U.N. Official Warns of Losing the
Peace in Kosovo,” The New York Times, 3 July 2000, p. A3.
36 Nehat Islami, “Kosovo Crime Wave.” Institute for War
and Peace Reporting Balkan Crisis ReportYo. 210, 17 January 
2001.
57 Bota Sot (Pristina), 11 July 2000.
38 Lutz Kleveman, "Brothers in Arms Fall Out Over Spoils 
of Kosovo," The Electronic Telegraph, 12June 2000.
39 See Roberto Suro, "In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission."
The Washington Post, 20 September 2000, p. A01. In what has 
become all-to-characteristic of the U.S. approach to the 
Balkans, rather than coming up with a policy to deal with 
these problems, officials in the Clinton Administration 
decided that the overriding priority in an election year was 
to keep Kosovo “off the front page.” Sec Jane Perlez,
“Spiral of Violence in Kosovo Divides U.S. and its Allies,” 
The New York Times, 12 March 2000, p. 1.
2000, a newspaper linked to Hashim Thaci accused 
a Serb working for UNMIK of being a war 
criminal, and published his photograph, address, 
and workplace. On May 14lh, the individual in 
question was stabbed to death. UNMIK's response 
was little more than a slap on the wrist, closing the 
paper in question for eight days. The editor of the 
paper immediately announced that it would 
continue to publish similar stories on individuals it 
had branded “war criminals.”60
Nor can NATO take credit for stopping ethnic 
cleansing. As Dennis McNamara, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ special envoy to the 
Balkans, noted in March 2000,
The tragedy is we got nearly a million (ethnic Albanian) people 
back and a quarter of a million new ones (Serbs and other 
minorities) left ... It is a destabilising factor and it makes it 
difficult to see how, in regional terms, a stability pact for 
southeastern Europe, which is predicated on population 
stability, can go very far until we can deal with that refugee 
problem.61
Indeed, since June 1999 when NATO troops 
moved into Kosovo, we have witnessed what is 
perhaps the most comprehensive campaign of 
ethnic cleansing yet seen in the Balkans. During this 
NATO-monitored ethnic-cleansing over a quarter 
of a million people—Serbs, Roma, Turks, Gorani, 
Bosniacs, Croats, and the Jews of Pristina—have 
been driven from their homes. U.N. Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan has called the new ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovo "orchestrated," while a top
60 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Halts Publication of Kosovo 
Newspaper," The Washington Post, 4 June 2000, p. A22. See 
also Danica Krka, "Kosovo Media Practice Targeted," The 
Associated Press, 30 May 2000. Ironically, some Kosovo 
Albanian journalists now claim that their working conditions 
were better before the NATO intervention. As one 
journalist recently described the atmosphere of intimidation 
reporters are now working under, given KLA harassment, 
“Under the Serbs, you knew what to expect when you wrote 
something they didn’t like. They might come and beat you, 
trash the office, or throw you in jail, but that was part of the 
job, and you felt it was worth the risk. It was part of the 
struggle to end the repression. Now, with these hoods, you 
can’t predict what they will do. They might not even warn 
you, just come up and put a bullet in your head.” See Colin 
Soloway, “Intimidation Silences Pristina Media,” IWPR 
Balkan Cnsis Report Yo. 215, 6 February 2001.




U.S. official has labeled it "systematic."62 Perhaps 
the most serious rebuke of NATO's efforts, 
however, has come from Carla del Ponte, the chief 
prosecutor for the ICTY, who recendy claimed that 
“What is happening (in the Serbian province) is as 
serious as what happened before.”63 That is, what 
is happening in NATO's Kosovo is as serious as 
what happened in Milosevic's Kosovo.
Nevertheless, NATO officials need not worry 
that Madame del Ponte will turn her attentions on 
them because of Kosovo's current state, or because 
of their earlier violations of international law, or 
even because of the environmental destruction they 
are responsible for in the Balkans. As NATO 
spokesman Jamie Shea said during last year's war, 
"without NATO countries there would be no 
International Court of Justice, nor would there be 
any International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia because NATO countries are in the 
forefront of those who have established these two 
tribunals, who fund these tribunals and who 
support on a daily basis their activities.”64 Those 
who pay the piper, as they say, call the tune.
The Balkans’ “Depleted” Future
Gandhi once said that he would die for what he 
believed in, but he would never kill for it. 
“Operation Allied Force” turned Gandhi's belief 
most perversely on its head. While NATO 
countries were unwilling to risk the lives of their 
own “soldiers” to save the people they had 
allegedly gone to war to protect, they were more 
than willing to rain death and destruction on the 
region for the sake of “credibility.” As Noam 
Chomsky points out in his own typically incisive 
analysis of the Kosovo war, British operations 
during the conflict were code-named “Agricola.” 
Agricola, Chomsky reminds us, was the father-in- 
law of Tacitus, who once famously denounced
62 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration in Kosovo," S/2000/538, 6 June
2000. The comments by the U.S. official, James O'Brien, can 
be found in George Jahn, "Anti-Serb Violence 
Condemned," The Associated Press, 8 June 2000.
<13 "U.N. Tribunal Awaiting Arrests of Suspects Karadzic, 
Mladic," Renters, 18 July 2000.
M Shea's remarks were made during a NATO Press 
Conference in Brussels on 17 May 2000.
ancient Rome's own military misadventures by 
saying, “Brigands of the world, they create a 
desolation and call it peace.”6’
History may well judge NATO's actions in the 
same light. Glenny concludes his book by noting 
that the morality of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia 
will ultimately be decided by the dedication of 
Western countries to the reconstruction of 
southeastern Europe (p. 661). Here we could pose 
the issue more broadly, and ask to what extent 
Western policy in the region over the past 
decade—characterized by such things as military 
interventions, economic sanctions, and the creation 
of dysfunctional protectorates—has lain the 
foundations for long-term peace and stability in the 
region. Will subsequent generations see the Dayton 
Peace Accords and Operation Allied Force as 
efforts that ultimately brought democracy and 
economic prosperity to the Balkans? Or will they be 
seen as only the latest in a long line of attempts by 
the Great Powers, going back to the Congress of 
Berlin and the Versailles Treaty, to satisfy their own 
interests, even at the sake of setting the stage for 
new conflicts in southeastern Europe?
In the Bosnian context, a view typical of the 
interventionist Western attitude towards the 
Balkans calls on “Bosnia’s Serbs, Bosniacs, and 
Croats... to move away from narrow ethnic politics 
and begin to move toward European integration.”66 
But has this been either the historical or the 
contemporary experience of Europe itself? The 
basis for Europe’s (somewhat successful) post- 
World War II efforts at political and economic 
integration has been based on the emergence of 
viable democratic nation-states enjoying a 
significant degree of popular legitimacy. As Ash 
describes this process,
. . . we in Western Europe have long since been molded into 
nation-states, in a process that lasted from the Middle Ages to
65 Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo 
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999), p. 16.
“ Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, op. cit., p. 2. 
This observation is not meant to advocate a partition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, it is meant to critique an all- 
too-common Western interventionist approach, which both 
ignores most of European history and often assumes a neo-




the early twentieth-century . . . It’s precisely on this basis of 
clear separation into nation-states that we have been getting 
together in the European Union, as well as becoming more 
ethnically mixed again, through immigration.61
Indeed, the results of the European Union’s 
Nice summit suggest that there are definite limits to 
the degree to which Europeans—that is, those 
outside the Balkans—are willing to integrate.67 8 But 
if the modern concept of “Europe” is the goal 
towards which the peoples of southeastern Europe 
should strive, can they reach this goal by ignoring 
the historical path that “Europe” itself took to get 
there? Logically, perhaps, yes, but no one seems to 
have the right map.
Finally, if the international community’s goal is 
to create stable democracies in southeastern 
Europe, then one would expect that international 
efforts would be geared towards fostering 
economic prosperity in the region. As the authors 
of a recent study note,
Pew concepts in political science have been as widely accepted 
(particularly in the Western world) as the idea that socio-
economic well-being is the crucial foundation of a sound 
democracy. The formation and growth of a middle class 
through robust economic development is considered to be the 
bulwark of democratic stability.69
But far from fostering economic growth in 
southeastern Europe, Operation Allied Force, and 
many other aspects of Western policy over the past 
decade, have set back the region by years, if not 
decades. One estimate of the cost of the NATO 
bombing campaign to NATO itself was $40 
billion.70 The G17 group of independent
67 Sec Ash, “Cry, the Dismembered Country,” p. 32
68 See, for instance, Mark Mazower, “Nice and the nation-
state,” The Financial Times (London), 21 December 2000, p. 
21. As Mazower points out, “The rise of the nation-state as 
the dominant form of polity on the continent-unimaginable 
even in 1850-was the basic story of the 20th century . . . the 
European nation state, born of war, having survived Hitler 
and the cold war . . . Jhasj revealed its ability to survive 
through adaptation once more.”
69 Stefano Bianchini and Marko Dogo, "Foreword," in The 
Balkans: National Identities in a Historical Perspective. Stefano 
Bianchini and Marco Dogo, eds. (Ravenna: Congo Editore, 
1998), p. 16.
70 Michael R. Scsit, "Cost of Kosovo War Could 1 lit S40
Billion," The Wall Street Journal, 29 July 1999, p. All.
economists in the FRY estimate that the NATO 
attacks resulted in an estimated $30 billion worth of 
damage to the FRY’s economy and infrastructure.71 
Contrast these figures with the annual UNMIK 
budget, which amounts to less than half of one- 
day's bombing.72
Nor was the FRY the only country in the region 
to suffer from Operation Allied Force; in fact, the 
economies of all seven countries of southeastern 
Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Macedonia, and the 
FRY) went into an economic recession after the 
Kosovo conflict.73 Western efforts to reconstruct 
the region, such as the “Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe,” inaugurated with much 
fanfare in Sarajevo in July 1999, have been 
dismissed as being “little more than a photo- 
opportunity.”74 Not surprisingly, regional leaders 
have grown tired of Western promises of aid. 
Former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu 
summed up the thoughts of many when he claimed, 
“We really have had enough of your nice words, 
while you do nothing to stop our losses, which 
grow bigger each day.”7’
Now that the “evil leader” in Belgrade is finally 
gone and the Balkans are no longer front page
71 See “Ekonomske posledice NATO bombardovanja: 
procena stete i sredstava potrebnih za ekonomsku 
rekonstrukeiju Jugoslavije,” available at 
http://www.gl7plus.org.yu.
72 Misha Glenny, "The Muddle in Kosovo," The Wall Street 
Journal, 23 February 2000.
,3 Economic Survey of Europe, No. 1,2000 (Geneva: United 
Nations Economic Commission on Europe), p. 6.
74 The statement was made by Prof. Ivo Banac during a 
seminar at the Harriman Institute on 1 December 2000.
7’ Bianca Guruita, "The Price of Acquiescence," Transitions 
OnUne, 7 October 1999. One estimate of the cost of the 
international sanctions regime on the FRY to neighboring 
countries as of 1996 was S35 billion. See Unfinished Peace: 
Report of the Internationa! Commission on the Balkans 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1996), p. 8. Given the catastrophic state of the Romanian 
economy, which can in part be attributed to the damage that 
Romania has incurred because of various Western policies, 
such as the sanctions regime imposed on the FRY, and the 
closing of the Danube (itself a result of NATO actions), it 
should not be surprising that a majority' of Romanian voters 
on 27 November 2000 cast their ballots for parties of either 
the extreme left or the extreme right.
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news, the region will soon become passe for all of 
the laptop bombardiers, indignant columnists and 
photo-op seeking politicians that Ash collectively 
calls the “something-must-be-done brigade.”76 
Indeed, top foreign policy advisors for the new U.S. 
administration are already calling for a decreased 
U.S. involvement in the Balkans. As the 
“something-must-be-done brigade” goes on to 
“save” other parts of the world, the peoples of 
southeastern Europe will again be left on their own 
to try to devise some formula for living side by
side, in the absence of war, at least, if not in peace 
and harmony. Unfortunately, after Operation Allied 
Force they will be that much poorer, and dealing 
with yet another tragic legacy of bloody foreign 
intervention.
Gordon N. Bardos is Program Officer at the Harriman 
Institute.
7tl See Ash, “Kosovo: Was it Worth It?” op. cit., p. 60.
51
